IMI-Analyse 2025/09en
Going to war with a trillion euros, „whatever it takes“…
15 aspects on which little has been reported
von: Tobias Pflüger | Veröffentlicht am: 24. März 2025
In addition to the press coverage of the trillion-euro packages for infrastructure and armaments, the following points deserve to be highlighted here, partly because they have (so far) received little to no attention in the reporting:
1. The infrastructure programme and the uncapped billions for armaments („whatever it takes“, Friedrich Merz) are two sides of the same coin, they are joint at the hip. From the perspective of the architects, neither of these multi-billion packages would have made much sense in isolation. The minister-presidents of the german federal states have clearly stated that there should be no separation of the military and the infrastructure packages. The minister-president of the Saarland, Anke Rehlinger (SPD), warned against separating the topics of defence and infrastructure. „Combining defence and the special infrastructure fund is politically prudent,“ Rehlinger told the Süddeutsche Zeitung newspaper. Otherwise, as was once the case during the banking crisis, the public could gain the impression that „there is money for tanks, but not for me“. (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 March 2025) Many of the other minister-presidents have expressed similar sentiments. They insisted on adopting both parts of the package together. This is also in line with internal logic, as the infrastructure financial package is not a completely civilian financial package.
2. The so-called financial package of 500 billion euros is by no means a purely civilian infrastructure programme. Military criteria will play a major role in the allocation of funds from the financial package.
The former federal minister for transport, Volker Wissing (FDP), said in a programme with host Sandra Maischberger on the german public TV network ARD (transcript T.P.): „Let’s also not forget that infrastructure is part of our security architecture. Many people overlook the fact that civil infrastructure is also necessary for military mobility. And Germany is an important transit country for NATO.“ Maischberger: „NATO has just said that everything that goes from north to south from east to west, so to speak, goes via German motorways.“ Wissing: „Yes, and of course it is also transported via the German railways, which is why we must not separate the two as some people do, saying that we think it’s good for defence, but we don’t need it for infrastructure. Because without infrastructure, we cannot achieve external security.“ (ARD programme Maischberger 11.03.2025: Volker Wissing) Wissing is quoted by dpa as saying: „Infrastructure investments are important for our security“. „We are talking about infrastructure, both road and rail, which we need for the defence of our country.“
3. The infrastructure programme is linked to the „Operations Plan Germany“ („OPLAN DEU“), a secret document that has been in place for some time, which regulates civil-military cooperation and in particular the functioning of logistics and transport options for the Bundeswehr and other NATO armies and is currently being implemented piece by piece. The idea is that a deployment to the east should take place via the infrastructure in Germany. The EU has programmes called „Military Mobility“ for this purpose. Civilian organisations such as the German Red Cross (DRK) and fire brigades are closely involved and part of the „Operation Plan Germany“. The „Operations Plan Germany“ is also to be implemented on the municipal level. Military criteria therefore play a central role in the extensive infrastructure measures of the financial package. This is one more reason to reject the infrastructure funding package as such.
An association representing the interests of logistics companies lays out what this could look like in concrete terms: „Infrastructure and defence must be designed in conjunction with each other to a large extent: Defence-critical infrastructure is an essential part of overall national responsibility. This includes all measures that support and ensure the deployment of NATO forces.“ „Roads and bridges, but also rail infrastructure, could be anchored in Section 14 (Defence) instead of Section 12 (Digital and Transport) of the federal budget. The open-ended amendment to the debt brake may then apply to the latter. As with replacement bridges, it would be possible to streamline authorisation requirements by means of simple legislation. In this way, a predominantly public interest could be established from a security policy perspective and this could be regulated in a court of law as a priority consideration.“ (Bundesverband für Eigenlogistik und Verlader, press release, 20 March 2025) The logistics companies obviously want a piece of the action here.
4. Could the trillion-euro infrastructure and armaments package have been prevented in parliament? In the second chamber, the Bundesrat, the state governments in favour of the double package did not have a sufficient majority. First the Free Voters (FW), coalition partners in Bavaria, fell over, Hubert Aiwanger stated that his job was on the line because the SPD was ready to replace the Free Voters. (taz, 21.3.2025) This meant that there was a majority in favour of the double package. The fact that the government representatives of the Left Party in the coalitions in Bremen and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania then also voted in favour – contrary to the party’s resolutions – is nothing short of embarrassing.
5. It is obvious that the CDU/CSU/SPD coalition will still make cuts in areas other than the military because the „normal“ budget has to be financed „alongside“ the investment package and the billions in armaments. Merz, for example, announced after the vote on the trillion euros:
„We now have such excessive social spending, including at local authority level, that we now have to put everything to the test.“ And:
„We have a gap of around 80 billion euros“. Calculating the effect of the trillion-euro packages, he said that „even then, we are still missing 30 to 40 billion euros“. (merkur, 24 March 2025)
The hundreds of billions in the investment package are intended to finance „additional“ investments. Incidentally, the „additional“ is there at the request of the Greens, but this means that the social cuts announced by Merz are already in the bag.
6. It is „thanks“ to the Greens that large amounts of the infrastructure billions are being channelled into arms supplies, particularly to Ukraine. This was decided by the Budget Committee immediately after the vote in the Bundestag. „For the current year, three billion euros are therefore available in addition to the previously planned four billion euros“; (tagesspiegel, 19 March 2025) „for the years 2026 to 2029, further funds of 8.25 billion euros have also been approved. This means that contracts for deliveries can now be concluded.“ (tagesschau.de, 21 March 2025) „According to the German government, the funds released will be used to purchase missiles, surveillance radars, reconnaissance drones, protected combat vehicles, small arms and ‚various additional equipment‘, among other things. The first deliveries are due to start soon. Iris-T and Patriot air defence systems are also to be ordered.
However, these still have to be produced and it could be two years before they are delivered.“ (br.de, 21.3.2025)
7. For all procured war weapons and other military equipment, arms exports are an essential part of the planning and implementation of the procurement of war weapons and other military equipment; this is a finding from the discussions of procurement projects, the so-called 25 million proposals, in the Defence Committee. Translated, this means that arms exports, which will soon skyrocket anyway as a result of the procurement of Special Fund I, will once again increase considerably.
The current hundreds of billions in armaments are therefore a flow heater for many more arms exports all over the world in the coming years. And the fact that arms exports from or arms co-operation with Germany are also used in wars in violation of international law can currently be seen, for example, in Turkey or Israel.
8. The focus of the current billions in armaments should be on armaments from the EU and allied states. Especially at the beginning, procurement decisions for Special Fund I were primarily focused on large, off-the-shelf weapons, such as the F-35. On the one hand, this “ off-the-shelf buying“ was even more expensive; on the other hand, procurement often focused on weapons from the US. Thus, an internal switch within the defence industry is taking place.
However, and this is often overlooked, the defence industry of Western countries and their geopolitical allies is usually structured in such a way that a wide variety of defence companies are involved in individual defence projects, and these defence companies often come from different countries. Defence industry cooperations involving German and US companies are very common. To refer once again to the F-35 fighter, Rheinmetall, the loudest defence company based in Germany (Düsseldorf), builds fuselage components for the F-35. 2023, it was stated: „Together with its American partners Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin, Rheinmetall has reached another important milestone in a key Bundeswehr project, while simultaneously opening a new chapter in German-American defence technology cooperation. The Düsseldorf-based tech enterprise plans to build an ultramodern factory at Weeze in the Kleve district of the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) to produce fuselage sections for the F-35A Lightning II, the world’s top-performing warplane.“ (Rheinmetall, press release, 4 July 2023) Lufthansa is also on board: „Lufthansa has announced that it will participate in a consortium with the Rheinmetall Group for the production and maintenance of parts for the Lockheed F-35 fighter jet. The participation in the defence project is a strategic step, said Lufthansa CEO Carsten Spohr on Thursday evening in Frankfurt.
In view of armed conflicts, there is a need for technical support to improve the defence capabilities of armies worldwide. Lufthansa also wanted „to be on board for the heavy transport helicopter in the large helicopter order that the German Armed Forces are negotiating with Boeing,“ said Spohr.“ (tagesschau.de, 15.9.2023)
Consequently, Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger, of all people, warned against „risking the transatlantic partnership“ according to the press, calling for „talks with Trump“. And: „The USA is currently irreplaceable in the defence sector“. „There are valid treaties“. „Transatlantic cooperation, including in defence, should not be put at risk.“ (Deutschlandfunk, 13 March 2025) „Europeans-only weapons“ will therefore not be so easy. Nonetheless, there is a trend towards „purely European“ projects, particularly in new defence projects. A key example is the „Future Combat Air System“ (FCAS), which has so far been a Franco-German-Spanish co-operation, and the progress of this „European“ armaments project has been correspondingly bumpy.
9. The release of funds for armaments is one thing, but procurement decisions and, in particular, the implementation of these, especially for large weapons, usually take quite a long time. Many armaments projects, especially major weapons projects, have a lead time of 5 to 12 years (sometimes even longer). When the hundreds of billions of euros that have now been released will actually reach the Bundeswehr in the form of weapons of war and other armaments is a completely different story. What is important is that it is completely open whether the geopolitical situation will still be the same as it is today. But the rearmament is nevertheless declared to be a reaction to the current geopolitical situation.
10. Several companies from different federal states are saying that companies that have previously produced other things are now eager and already planning to switch to armaments production. In Brandenburg, Minister Keller (SPD) is promoting armaments companies [tagesspiegel, 13 March 2025]: „If companies that are active in armaments settle here, there will be no problems with this state government.“ (Mind you, the BSW is part of the government in Brandenburg.) Bavarian State Premier Markus Söder is convening an armaments summit to exchange ideas with the extensive Bavarian defence industry. „The state government will be organising a „Bavarian armaments summit“ in the coming weeks, Minister President Markus Söder told the „Süddeutsche Zeitung“ newspaper. „Around a third of all German defence companies are based in Bavaria, said Söder. Bavaria is already a European leader in defence tech. ‚We will now expand this commitment even more‘.“ (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21.3.2025)
In Baden-Württemberg, minister-president Winfried Kretschmann (Greens) declares that Baden-Württemberg should and wants to shift its new economic focus to armaments. „We have to do the same in this area as we have done and continue to do in civilian applications. In other words, we must also produce high-tech in defence. We already have key players in our country who can do this. For example, Diehl Defence, which is based at Lake Constance and is a world leader in certain air defence systems (…) However, technological leadership must be our aspiration in the entire defence industry. I am sure that this will become a new industrial focus for Baden-Württemberg.“ „We can help companies to network, for example. Not only in Baden-Württemberg, but also beyond, both nationally and internationally. The aim must be to gradually build up a European defence industry.“ „Incidentally, the process also includes civilian areas of the economy. Here, too, companies must be trained to supply more to the defence sector. This used to be called dual use and people didn’t like to talk about it. Today, however, it is necessary and important.“ Question: So you see defence as an opportunity for the economy and jobs in our federal state? „Yes, it is an opportunity. German defence spending will rise sharply in the coming years. There is a target of three per cent of the gross domestic product being spent on armaments. Or even more. It is therefore clear that this sector will become an important economic factor. We have to be there with our potent high technology.“ (cf. Südkurier, 4 March 2025) This is a clear message: weapons instead of cars. There are already high concentrations of defence companies, at least in the Stuttgart, Ulm and Lake Constance areas. Several companies in Germany are already engaged in „counter-conversion“, i.e. the conversion of civilian production into military production, and others want to and will follow suit. Overall, defence production will become increasingly dominant with these hundreds of billions. However, armaments production is never sustainable, weapons of war and other armaments are designed to wreak destruction, they destroy and are often destroyed in the process.
11. There are open plans and talk about transforming the EU economy into a „war economy“. (t-online, 16 March 2025) To this end, drafts for so-called instruments such as EDIP and others are already circulating and are in the pipeline. Decisions have been prepared by the EU summit for the EU Commission „to grant EU loans of 150 billion euros for armament projects“ „and to exempt defence spending from the strict EU debt rules“ A total of 800 billion euros is to be mobilised for armaments over the next four years. (https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/eu-gipfel-aufruestung-102.html) More details on the developments at EU level can be found elsewhere.
12. There will be a reorganisation of hospitals to make them „war-ready“. In addition to very specific plans, e.g. in Cologne for wartime hospitals (welt, 24 March 2025), state health ministers are also calling for all hospitals to be fit for war: „We therefore need a comprehensive ‚Civilian Operations Plan Germany'“. „Because an intact healthcare system is just as important for the defence of a country as the Bundeswehr,“ says CSU Health Minister Judith Gerlach (CSU) of Bavaria. (Spiegel 17.03.2025) Surgeon General Johannes Backus says:
„Defence capability also begins in the hospital“. „These hospitals must be specifically upgraded to support the Bundeswehr in an emergency, organisationally, technically and digitally“. „In such a scenario, Germany will be a logistical hub for troops and casualty transports.“
(FAZ, 18.03.2025) The SPD Minister of Health in Thuringia, Katharina Schenk, expressed a similar view. (Ärzteblatt, 18.3.2025) A comprehensive militarisation of the healthcare system is therefore to be expected.
13. There is an urgent need for political control of the many armaments projects that will now follow. As a former member of the German Bundestag’s Defence Committee and the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence, I would like to say with regard to the political and parliamentary control of this gigantic armaments expenditure and the resulting individual armaments projects that parliamentary control is becoming increasingly difficult in view of the financial dimension and size, as control also means looking at the individual armaments projects in detail in some cases, uncovering where there are planning errors and obvious waste. And political control also means that journalists report on all the defence projects and their inherent problems. To what extent will this take place in the current media situation in the area of the Bundeswehr, war and peace? Political control „from the outside“ is all the more necessary.
14. On the fringes of the NATO summit in July 2024, Olaf Scholz and Joe Biden agreed in a protocol declaration to station US medium-range weapons in Germany – presumably in Grafenwoehr. There is no indication that this decision will be reversed. The deployment of various US medium-range weapons is therefore still to be expected. What is rarely mentioned is that there are plans to replace these US medium-range weapons with „homegrown“ „European“ medium-range missiles in the medium term. See the relevant literature by Wolfgang Richter, Jürgen Wagner and Claudia Haydt.
15. Finally, those who believe that they can make policy in other areas without having anything to do with these armaments, military and geopolitical issues are deluding themselves, especially after the decision on the de facto injection of one trillion for infrastructure and armaments. The dimensions of the two packages are so enormous and so extensive that this trillion-euro package casts its shadow on every other political issue that has anything to do with funding and political priorities – which leaves few exceptions. It is a decision which, given its sheer dimensions, will affect several generations to come. And it is a decision that one can only be for or against.
