Zur Rechtfertigung der NATO-Präsenz in Osteuropa dienen Planspiele, denen zufolge Russland die baltischen Staaten binnen kürzester Zeit überrennen und im Anschluss daran die „Suwalki-Lücke“ nach Weißrussland dichtmachen könne (siehe IMI-Studie 2015/11). Im National Interest (via Bpb-Newsletter) wird nun ausgeführt, wie darauf reagiert werden sollte und dass alle militärischen Optionen, die in diesem Zusammenhang gegenwärtig diskutiert werden, massives Eskalationspotenzial in sich bergen: „The first option is learning to live with it. This is called mutual vulnerability. (…) The second option is enhanced NATO presence in the vicinity of the gap. (…) The end result is a spiral of a regional arms race until the growing tension snaps and explodes in a direct NATO-Russia military conflict. (…) The third option is regime change in Belarus. (…) The fourth and final option is to quickly take out Kaliningrad in case of conflict. The Suwalki corridor can be secured on very short notice — literally within the first hours of conflict — if the Russian forces deployed in the exclave are incapacitated. (…) the only option that does not involve an arms race and increased tension — learning to live with mutual vulnerability — runs against the predominant mood in NATO and in the countries immediately involved in the Suwalki dilemma, Poland and the Baltic states. Yet, this is the only option (especially if coupled with confidence-building measures and negotiations to reduce concentration of forces) that holds any hope of avoiding conflict.“ (jw)
