IMI-Aktuell 2018/693

Russlands Nukleardoktrin

von: 13. Dezember 2018

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Die geplante „Modernisierung“ (sprich: Aufrüstung) des US-Atomwaffenarsenals wird damit begründet, Russland habe sein atomare Einsatzschwelle herabgesenkt. Tatsächlich ist es eher das Gegenteil der Fall, worauf u.a. Kristin Ven Bruusgaard vom Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) im National Interest hinweist (via Bpb-Newsletter): „Russian declaratory strategy is not one of ‚escalate to de-escalate‘ or nuclear preemption. Official communications, including the last three iterations of Russian military doctrine and several statements made by President Putin, Defense Minister Shoigu and General Staff Chief Gerasimov, point to Russian attempts to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. In October, Putin explicitly sought to clarify Russian nuclear doctrine to a Western audience: ‚Nuclear preemption is not in our doctrine.‘ Still, U.S. policymakers continue to assert that Russian doctrine is one of preemption. […] New American low-yield nuclear warheads is a strategic response based on not the most likely, but the most dangerous possible interpretation of Russian strategy, one directly at odds with Russian declaratory nuclear strategy.“ (jw)