IMI-Analyse 2010/038

Lobbyists in Arms

The Role of Corporate Interest Groups in the EU Military-Industrial Complex

von: Malte Lühmann | Veröffentlicht am: 2. November 2010

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Lobbying as usual?

The incremental integration of military, security and armament issues into the framework of the European Union has reached its newest culmination point in the Lisbon Treaty, codifying the role of the EU as a military power. The road towards a unified military Europe has already been long and the present state is still far from reaching the final goal. However, recent decades have seen the emergence of a powerful military-industrial complex in the Union, comprising of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), an armaments agency coordinating arms procurement throughout Europe (EDA), and a powerful arms industry including four of the ten largest arms-producing companies in the world.[1] In addition, after the attacks of September 11th 2001 a domestic homeland-security industry has emerged and the EU established a security research program worth over € 1 billion.

While the setting up of military and security capabilities in the EU has been widely discussed in the literature,[2] the role of lobbyists in the process and their general position in this policy field has not been acknowledged by mainstream IR-scholars, though it has been highlighted in recent years in critical studies.[3] In general, the arms-industry and military/security policies are mostly excluded from lobbying-studies, which is quite surprising because a whole range of other policy areas from industrial and trade to agricultural and environmental policies are well researched. This may in part be due to the trajectory of lobby research which focused in the past on sectoral corporate interest groups, trade unions and later on new social movements mostly present in the mentioned sectors.[4] Secondly, military/security policies are a relatively new, albeit fast growing, competence of the EU. Lobbying in this area has therefore only recently gained relevance. As a consequence lobbying in the EU military-industrial complex remains a blind spot for current research on lobbying.

The state of the European military and security politics has been described by some as a situation in which the armament industry and its allies in the European bureaucracy have seized control, evoking the term “military-industrial complex” as a description.[5] Drawing the picture of a concerted action of the armaments industry closely tied to the European institutions, this concept does not seem to be easily compatible with a picture of different interest groups‘ lobbyists trying to influence policy-making. Furthermore, there is no consent on how lobbying is to be conceptualized at all in the European Union. As will be shown in the forthcoming section, the concept as it is defined in most mainstream literature focuses mostly on the realization of specific group interests into policies by means of competition among different lobby groups. Also, the most recent form of mainstream integration theory, namely the governance approach, stresses the deliberative form of the policy-making process while disregarding the power structures underlying not only formal state institutions but also civil society. The approaches differ mostly in their perspective on the state, which is seen sometimes as a neutral arbiter, a central actor deciding which group gains access to decision-making, or a player amongst others in a policy-network. These perspectives do not seem to appreciate the role of powerful corporate interests in the emergence and current functioning of the EU military-industrial complex as well as the partial role of the state herein. Therefore this paper draws on critical (neo-gramscian) approaches to European integration, which contrast these views.

Coming to terms with lobbyism in the EU

Concerning lobbyism and its influence in European policy-making, three strands of theory have been most influential to date. To begin with, pluralism formed an important basis for theorizing the role of interest groups in modern democracies.[6] Pluralism perceives the existence of interest groups as a vital prerequisite for the functioning of democracy. Interest groups are seen to make individual preferences heard in the public and to form policy in competition with each other, with the state as a neutral arbiter. This theory has been criticized early on especially because, contrasting what the theory suggests, some groups are more powerful in society and therefore more likely to realize their interest than others.[7] While newer neo-pluralist attempts try to solve this problem by giving more attention to the distribution of power among groups, they still fail to acknowledge structural constrains and the active role of the state. An early critique of this view was expressed in 1956 by Charles Wright Mills in his book “The Power Elite”.[8] The book not only makes a strong point against the idea of equal opportunities for different interests, it also conceptualized for the first time the military-industrial complex as a close relationship between industrial, military and political elites in the US. Therefore, Mills’ analysis and the ensuing debate – including US-President Eisenhower’s warning in 1961 – can be seen as the foundation of today’s notion of the EU military-industrial complex.

A second approach to interest groups is corporatism, which takes a somewhat different position than pluralism. In corporatist thinking, interest groups remain important actors but their access to policy-making is moderated by the state.[9] Thus, this theory assigns a pivotal role to the state as the central actor in political bargaining. The basic idea of corporatism derives from the forms of social contract between governments, big business and trade unions, which emerged during Fordist capitalism in Western Europe and elsewhere. It describes a mostly formalized agreement of power-sharing between the state and organized economic interests. This form of interest group policy-making has been in decline since the beginning of the crisis of Fordism in the 1970s.[10] Even though forms of corporatism still exist, not least in the EU, they remain limited to some sectors with formalized agreements. Therefore they seem to be far from embracing the whole range of interest group activities in the European polity.[11]

An increasingly popular description of the policy-making processes challenges the centrality of state institutions in the corporatist model and stresses instead a wide variety of governance forms.[12] It is argued that networks and governance are more differentiated tools for analysis than the concepts of pluralism and corporatism, as they allow for more detailed descriptions of actor roles, differences between policy areas and actor relations.[13] Though the governance approach to European integration is very diverse, most scholars share common ground as far as they “theorize EU-governance as non-hierarchical, mobilizing networks of private as well as public actors, who engage in deliberation and problem-solving efforts guided as much by informal as by formal institutions”.[14] Network-oriented EU lobby research is closely related to this agenda as it shares the basic question for the functioning of EU policy-making as well as the assumption of a network-based process heavily relying on private actors.[15] The role of private actors in the policy-making process is estimated to be especially high when examining the EU. The total absence of a traditionally elected government in the EU has brought scholars to the conclusion that its polity can be described from the beginning as a system of multi-level-governance.[16]

Without disagreeing on the description of the EU as a network-like multi-level-governance structure, critical scholars emphasize that this structure cannot be equated with a level playing field.[17] They accuse mainstream approaches to European integration of neglecting the power relations inherent in capitalist market structures and thus argue that structural power has to be examined as a central determinant for the trajectory of the integration process.[18] They argue that the capitalist nature of the European social order and the function of the state as its sustainer as well as the states dependence on tax revenue and investment convert the special interest of business into the general interest of the political system.[19] In this sense European statehood is understood as a social relation reflecting the uneven balance of power in contemporary capitalist societies.[20] Though at the same time it enjoys relative autonomy from particular social interests and takes collectively binding decisions. Therefore, the state, and the single bureaucrats comprising it, is both autonomous and dependent on the capitalist economy.[21] Under these circumstances specific businesses cannot rely on the state to automatically defend their special interests in the name of the common good. Instead they have to take active part in the decision making process in order to put their specific demands on the agenda. Without further exploration of the dual nature of the state, we can deduce two important assumptions for an assessment of the EU military-industrial complex’s operating mode. First, the state cannot be seen as a neutral mediator nor as a single powerful decision making body. Instead, it is structurally open to business interests, though not automatically in line with them. Secondly, business lobbyists are not merely advancing an interest in this context on equal terms with other interest groups. They enjoy structural power and preferential access to policy-making, which ensures their voices to be heard. Lobbying thus should be understood as an endeavor on rough terrain not on a level playing field, with some lobbyists standing on the commanding heights right next to official policy-makers while others stand back in the valleys of civil society dialogue.

Militarized integration – a new playing field emerges

Militarization of the EU has been progressing fast-paced during the past twenty years. Today military institutions in the EU, common arms procurement projects, growing integration of the arms industry, and extensive cooperation among military forces have become a reality. The roots of this new situation lie as far back as those of the economic and political integration process in Europe.[22] First attempts to form a military Europe were made in the early 1950s, with the Pleven plan and the initiative for a European Defense Community (EDC). Such attempts however have not resulted in significant integration dynamics and from the failure of the EDC project in 1954 till the 1990s, military cooperation has been mostly confined to the framework of NATO, with the Western European Union (WEU) as its European appendix.

However, things came to a change in 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty codified for the first time a common European defense architecture as part of the European Union, leading to the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), later supplemented by the narrower Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).[23] In the same year, the WEU was re-vitalized with a new set of tasks. The so-called “Petersberg tasks” comprise the use of European armed forces for humanitarian interventions all over the world, they were transferred to the CFSP latter as part of the absorption of the WEU into the EU. The third and last significant event in the year 1992 was the founding of the Eurocorps, a multinational army corps involving several European countries including Germany and France who had formed the Franco-German Brigade as a nucleus of this force in 1987. Subsequent milestones include the elaboration of the Helsinki Headline Goal by the European Council in 1999, which set the agenda for military capability development in line with the Petersberg tasks, the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2000, coordinating armament procurement and R&D, and the European Security Strategy (ESS) written in 2003 by then-High Representative of the CFSP, Javier Solana.[24] Recent and related developments are the employment of European space assets for military purposes in the framework of the GMES and Galileo projects and the creation of a European security research program as part of the Seventh Framework Program for Research and Technological Development (FP7), funded with € 1.4 billion from 2007 to 2013.[25]

Even though defense and security policies had been integrated into the institutional framework of the EU as part of the CFSP, a further step was necessary to accomplish the militarization of the Union. In order to anchor the military aspect in the juridical basis of the EU, important changes have been introduced via the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force on 1st of December 2009.[26] First, the treaty creates a new position for the High Representative of the CFSP, fusing the role of Commission Vice-President in charge of External Relations and the chair of the Foreign Affairs Council in one powerful actor. Together with the also newly created European External Action Service (EEAS) the new role of the High Representative is supposed to foster coherence and effective decision making in foreign and security policies. Secondly, enhanced co-operation has been expanded to defense issues, allowing a number of member states to take action in this policy area, effectively pushing military integration forward without waiting for EU-wide consensus. Third, the treaty entails a solidarity clause in case of military or terrorist attacks and other cases of emergency, effectively transforming the EU into a military alliance. Fourth and finally, the Treaty of Lisbon represents a significant step in terms of arms procurement.[27] In addition to formally sanctioning the EDA, the treaty introduces a military budget, which had been explicitly banned in the Treaty of Nice, and calls for an increase in arms spending by the member states.

In parallel to these political and military developments, a process of Europeanization took place in the arms industry. The single most notable step in this context was the forming of the EADS corporation in 2000, a merger of national aerospace industry champions from Germany (DASA) and France (Matra) also incorporating the smaller Spanish aviation company CASA.[28] Though some national rivalries persist in the steering of EADS, it represents the primary example for trans-European integration in the arms industry. Similar ambitions can be observed in the shipbuilding sector.[29] Today, Europe’s arms producing corporations are among the biggest in the world, with a turnover of € 70 billion for the year 2008.[30] In the same year, British BAE-Systems ranked third among the 100 top defense companies world-wide, EADS number seven, the Italian Finmeccanica number nine, and French Thales number eleven.

Put together, this panorama gives an impression of the staggering transformations that have led to the emergence of a European military-industrial complex. However, this phenomenon has certainly not come out of the blue. It is therefore indispensable to shed light on the actors driving the process.

Suits and uniforms joining forces

Though security and defense policy still remains a field where national governments make final decisions in European policy-making, the competencies of EU-institutions have been significantly enlarged during the process of militarization. Meanwhile, the arms industry has been increasingly successful in introducing their policy proposals in the process and nowadays it enjoys a close co-operation with the Commission.[31] The industry’s interest in increased arms sells and overall military spending coincides at this point with the ambition of the European Union to play a more active role as a global player, employing both civilian and military means, as expressed in the ESS.[32] This convergence of interests has probably contributed to a large extent to the close ties established between the industry and EU-institutions.

A crucial role in the development and further enlargement of the EU military-industrial complex is played by expert groups such as the ‘Group of Personalities in the Field of Security Research’ (GoP), or the ‘Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st Century’ (STAR 21).[33] For the Commission, the establishment of expert groups is a prime tool of consultation in all policy fields; they are seen as a tool to compensate for the Commission’s lack of specialized staff.[34] Expert groups are formed at the beginning of almost every policy-making process to elaborate a policy proposal for the Commission.[35] Though, the groups have great influence on EU policies, as their proposals shape discussions and frequently constitute policy-outcomes without being significantly changed in the political process. While many expert groups are simply formed of Commission and other EU institutions’ or national governments’ staff, 287 out of a total of over 1000 groups included non-governmental participants in 2009.[36] Among these groups with external representatives 110 were clearly biased in favor of corporate interests.[37] The significant influence, business lobbyists can exert on EU policy-making trough expert groups, has made them a cornerstone of corporate lobbying strategies.[38] The case of the military-industrial complex is no exception here, as expert groups have been essential in aligning corporate interests and EU policies in this field.

Two examples of influential expert groups have been mentioned above. Their activities have resulted in important initiatives in European defense and armaments policies: The strategy for the aerospace industry, and the European security research program.

Following chronological order, the first efforts to be mentioned here was the STAR 21 initiative, set up by the Commission in 2001 to make proposals for an improvement of the “political and regulatory framework for aerospace in Europe”.[39] Among those forming the group were Javier Solana, several Commissioners and EP-members, including Erkki Liikanen, Philiphe Busquin, and Karl von Wogau, all of them known for their closeness to the arms industry,[40] and CEOs or chairmen of six top-ranking European aerospace companies. This discussion between the industry and leading EU-politicians resulted in a report, which calls among other things for increased EU-support for corporate market access strategies abroad and for public investments in research and development.[41] Several concerns have been raised by members of the European parliament as to the transparency and the outcomes of the STAR 21 initiative.[42] Explicit objections were articulated against the blurring of the distinction between civilian and military aerospace equipment in the report.[43] This concern seems to be fully justified, because the STAR 21 initiative can be seen as an important milestone on the way to a militarized dual-use conduct especially in relation to the European space policy, which systematically facilitates the deviation of funds from civilian budgets to military or security purposes.[44] Although, the Commission frequently emphasized, in her answers to the parliamentarians, that all members of STAR 21 participated as individuals and that the group did not at all take binding decisions, the groups‘ industry-friendly suggestions were fully embraced in the Commission’s further policies.[45]

In a very similar manner the arms industry and high ranking Commission members came together again in 2003 to discuss the future of European R&D in the security sector . The aim and eventual outcome was the establishment of a European research program funded with € 1.4 billion from 2007 to 2013 as mentioned earlier.[46] Participants in this case came from the Commission EP and other European bodies, including the individuals mentioned in the context of STAR 21, former and current members of national governments, scientists from four research institutes, and industry representatives from EADS, Thales, BAE Systems and others.[47] Virtually all members had direct or indirect links to the arms industry or military sector.[48] While no other interest groups were heard on the topic, who could have suggested diverging policy options, the suggestions of the GoP were again fully embraced by the Commission.[49]The establishment of a research budget explicitly for military and security R&D was a total novelty in the EU, it is therefore a significant step in the overall process of integrating military and armaments issues into the Union’s agenda. Once set up, the steering bodies, which decide on how exactly the security research budget is spent, is composed in the same manner as the GoP with vast participation of the arms industry.[50] This means that the same companies which apply for funds are deciding in principle how the money is spent.

Alongside the direct feed of corporate interests into EU policies through expert groups, several organizations in Brussels ensure constant attention to issues put forward by the arms industry. Among them, the industry’s association ASD (“AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe”) comes closest to a traditional lobby group. ASD is an umbrella organisation formed in 2004 as a merger of three older industry associations: AECMA, EDIG and EUROSPACE.[51] It represents national associations in the European defense sector with more than 800 companies. ASD representatives have good connections to European policy-makers and seem to be successful in promoting their interests in more government funding, more arms production and more arms exports.[52]

Unlike ASD, the Security & Defence Agenda (SDA) is a more unconventional, though highly effective group devised for informal networking and lobbying.[53] Formerly known as New Defence agenda (NDA), the SDA is a Brussels-based think-tank occupying a pivotal role in the European military-industrial community. Though portraying itself as an independent forum for discussion, the organization seems to share the agenda for a militarized Europe. The SDA’s power lies in the people it brings together. With Javier Solana, former EU High Representative for CFSP, and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, former Secretary General of NATO, as its patrons and other high ranking individuals on its advisory board, SDA possesses a distinguished membership.[54] In its regular summits, conferences, and dinners the organization brings EU and other government officials together with industry representatives and other members of the community on a strictly informal basis.[55] The SDA is thus able to provide a strategic forum for the military and security community in Europe.

Assessing the EU-MIC

If European integration as a whole can indeed be described as an elite project since the early 1950s,[56] the creation of the EU military-industrial complex stands as a case in point. As the previous section has shown, coordination between the arms industry and relevant institutional actors especially from the European Commission is common practice when it comes to military, security, and armament issues. On the basis of converging interests, an alliance between policy-makers and the arms producing industry has been forged in the EU.

This relation does not seem to fit the picture of diverse interests competing for influence on the policy-making process. In line with the theoretical considerations from the beginning of this paper, the situation might be better described in terms of the military-industrial complex metaphor instead of using conventional lobbying-vocabulary. The critical view on European policy-making introduced above seems to reflect this reality better than mainstream lobby-theories.

Though, to further consolidate this conclusion, several additional questions would have to be answered. First, the multi-level-dimension of European decision-making would have to be further explored. What is the role of national governments and their relation to national arms industries in the context of European militarization? Second, the relative autonomy of the state does not seem to be clearly visible in this case, which gives rise to the question for the limits of corporate influence and the possibility of an alternative agenda originating from the state level or from other groups. Clearly, these questions will be especially difficult to answer in relation to the EU military-industrial complex as secrecy and in-transparency are ubiquitous features of military and security policies.

[1] SIPRI (2010): SIPRI Yearbook 2010. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Summary. Stockholm: SIPRI, URL: http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/files/SIPRIYB10summary.pdf (23.08.2010): 12.

[2] Holland, Martin (2005): Common Foreign and Security Policy. The First Ten Years. London: Continuum; Howorth, Jolyon (2007): Security and Defence Policy in the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

[3] Slijper, Frank (2005): The emerging EU Military-Industrial Complex. Arms industry lobbying in Brussels. Amsterdam: TNI / Dutch Campaign Against Arms Trade; Hayes, Ben (2006): Arming Big Brother. The EU’s Security Research Programme. Amsterdam: TNI / Statewatch; Hayes, Ben (2009): NeoConOpticon. The EU Security-Industrial Complex. Amsterdam: TNI / Statewatch.

[4] Kleinfeld, Ralf / Willems, Ulrich / Zimmer, Annette (2007): Lobbyismus und Verbändeforschung: Eine Einleitung. In: ead. (eds.): Lobbying. Strukturen. Akteure. Strategien. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 7-35: 14.

[5] Slijper, Frank (2005): The emerging EU Military-Industrial Complex. Arms industry lobbying in Brussels. Amsterdam: TNI / Dutch Campaign Against Arms Trade: 34; Oikonomu, Iraklis (2006): Security research and the EU. Securing citizens, securing capital?. Paper presented at the 1st ECPR Graduate Conference, Essex, 7th – 9th September 2006: 24-25.

[6] Axford, Barrie (2002): Parties, Interest Groups and Public Opinion. In: Axford, Barrie / Browning, Gary K. / Huggins Richard / Rosamund, Ben (eds.): Politics. An Introduction. 2nd Ed. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 358-407: 391-392.

[7] Michalowitz, Irina (2007): Lobbying in der EU. Wien: Facultas Verlag: 31.

[8] Mills, Charles Wright (1956): The Power Elite. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[9] Axford, Barrie (2002): Parties, Interest Groups and Public Opinion. In: Axford, Barrie / Browning, Gary K. / Huggins Richard / Rosamund, Ben (eds.): Politics. An Introduction. 2nd Ed. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 358-407: 392-393.

[10] Picciotto, Sol (2007): Internationale Transformation des Staates. In: Prokla, Vol. 37, No. 147, 2007, pp. 251-272: 257.

[11] Michalowitz, Irina (2007): Lobbying in der EU. Wien: Facultas Verlag: 33.

[12] Pollack, Mark A. (2005): Theorizing EU Policy-Making. In: Wallace, Helen / Wallace, William / Pollack, Mark A. (eds.): Policy-Making in the European Union. 5th Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 13-48: 36-38.

[13] Börzel, Tanja A. (2009): Informelle Politik in Europa: Regieren in oder durch Netzwerke?. In: Kaiser, Wolfram / Gehler, Michael / Leucht, Brigitte (eds.): Networks in European Multi-Level Governance. From 1945 to the Present. Wien / Köln / Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, pp. 27-38: 28.

[14] Pollack, Mark A. (2005): Theorizing EU Policy-Making. In: Wallace, Helen / Wallace, William / Pollack, Mark A. (eds.): Policy-Making in the European Union. 5th Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 13-48: 36.

[15] Van Schendelen, Rinus (2007): Trends im EU-Lobbying und in der EU-Forschung. In: Kleinfeld, Ralf / Willems, Ulrich / Zimmer, Annette (eds.): Lobbying. Strukturen. Akteure. Strategien. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 65-91: 68.

[16] Kaiser, Wolfram / Gehler, Michael / Leucht, Brigitte (2009): Networks in Informal European Governance. Diachronic Perspectives on the European Union as a Multi-Level Polity. In: ead. (eds.): Networks in European Multi-Level Governance. From 1945 to the Present. Wien / Köln / Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, pp. 9-28: 10.

[17] Van Apeldoorn, Bastian / Overbeek, Henk / Ryner, Magnus (2003): Theories of European Integration. A Critique. In: Cafruny, Alan W. / Ryner, Magnus (eds.): A Ruined Fortress?. Neoliberal Hegemony and Transformation in Europe. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 17-45: 28.

[18] idem: 17.

[19] idem: 28.

[20] Drahokoupil, Jan / Van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan / Horn, Laura (2009): Introduction: Towards a Critical Political Economy of European Governance. In: ead. (eds.): Contradictions and Limits of Neoliberal European Governance. From Lisbon to Lisbon. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 6-8.

[21] idem: 10.

[22] Neuber, Arno (2006): The making of: Militärmacht EUropa. In: Pflüger, Tobias / Wagner, Jürgen (eds.): Welt-Macht EUropa. Auf dem Weg in weltweite Kriege. Hamburg: VSA Verlag, pp. 10-20: 11-12.

[23] The CSDP has been introduced in 2001 under the name “European Security and Defense Policy“ (ESDP) and was only recently renamed through the Lisbon treaty. Fröhlich, Stefan (2008): Die Europäische Union als globaler Akteur. Eine Einführung. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: 85.

[24] idem: 94-96; 108.

[25] Lösing, Sabine / Wagner, Jürgen (2010): Rüstung durch die Hintertür. Das EU-Sicherheitsforschungsprogramm. In: Ausdruck, Nr. 1, February 2010, pp. 29-30.

[26] Vasconcelos, Álvaro de (2009): ESDP after the Irish ‚yes‘. In: idem (ed.): What ambitions for European defence in 2020? 2nd ed. Paris: EUISS, pp. 11-13: 12-13.

[27] Pflüger, Tobias (2008): Reformvertrag: Ein militaristisches Europa wird möglich. In: www.imi-online.de (IMI-Standpunkt 2008/002), URL: http://www.imi-online.de/2008.php?id=1682 (30.8.2010).

[28] Behrens, Kai / Clouet, Louis-Marie (2009): Die Europäisierung des EADS-Konzerns. Berlin: DGAP (DGAP-Analyse Frankreich November 2009/No. 7): 5.

[29] Becker, Peter / Marx, Sebastian (2005): “Europäische Champions” – Aufgabe europäischer Rüstungspolitik? Fallbeispiel maritime Industrie. Berlin: SWP (Diskussionspapier der FG 1, 2005/ 01): 15-17.

[30] Aalto, Erkki / Keohane, Daniel / Mölling, Christian / Vaucorbeil, Sophie de (2008): Towards a European Defence Market. Paris: EUISS (Chaillot Paper No. 113): 96.

[31] Slijper, Frank (2005): The emerging EU Military-Industrial Complex. Arms industry lobbying in Brussels. Amsterdam: TNI / Dutch Campaign Against Arms Trade: 3.

[32] European Union (2003): A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003: 1; 11.

[33] Slijper, Frank (2005): The emerging EU Military-Industrial Complex. Arms industry lobbying in Brussels. Amsterdam: TNI / Dutch Campaign Against Arms Trade: 12.

[34] Vassalos, Yiorgos (2010): expert groups – letting corporate interest groups set the agenda?. In: Burley, Helen / Dinan, William / Haar, Kenneth / Hoedeman, Olivier / Wesselius, Erik (eds.): Bursting the Brussels Bubble. the battle to expose corporate lobbying at the heart of EU. Brussels: Alter-EU, pp. 76-86: 82.

[35] idem: 76-77.

[36] idem: 76; 85.

[37] idem: 85.

[38] idem: 83.

[39] European Commission (2003): Commission Communication: A Coherent Framework for Aerospace – a Response to the STAR 21 Report, COM(2003) 600 final: 3.

[40] Slijper, Frank (2005): The emerging EU Military-Industrial Complex. Arms industry lobbying in Brussels. Amsterdam: TNI / Dutch Campaign Against Arms Trade: 13; 20; 30.

[41] European Commission (2002): STAR 21. Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21th century. European Commission Enterprise Publications: 39.

[42] see for example: Staes, Bart (2002): Written Question P-1132/02 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Commission. Access to information about the STAR 21 talks. Official Journal 205 E , 29/08/2002 P. 0255 – 0256, URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:92002E1132:EN:HTML (05.09.2010).

[43] Huhne, Christopher (2002): Written Question E-3537/02 by Christopher Huhne (ELDR) to the Commission. STAR 21 Review. Official Journal 137 E , 12/06/2003 P. 0223 – 0224, URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:92002E3537:EN:HTML (05.09.2010); Lambert, Jean (2003): WRITTEN QUESTION E-0877/03 by Jean Lambert (Verts/ALE) to the Commission. European Commission document STAR 21 — Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st Century. Official Journal 280 E , 21/11/2003 P. 0108 – 0109, URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:92003E0877:EN:HTML (05.09.2010).

[44] Slijper, Frank (2008): From Venus to Mars. The European Union’s steps towards the militarization of space. Amsterdam: TNI / Dutch Campaign Against Arms Trade: 25-26.

[45] European Commission (2003): Commission Communication: A Coherent Framework for Aerospace – a Response to the STAR 21 Report, COM(2003) 600 final: 1-3.

[46] Group of Personalities in the field of Security Research (GoP) (2004): Research for a Secure Europe. GoP Report. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities: 6.

[47] idem: 4-5.

[48] Slijper, Frank (2005): The emerging EU Military-Industrial Complex. Arms industry lobbying in Brussels. Amsterdam: TNI / Dutch Campaign Against Arms Trade: 13.

[49] Hayes, Ben (2006): Arming Big Brother. The EU’s Security Research Programme. Amsterdam: TNI / Statewatch: 20; Hayes, Ben (2009): NeoConOpticon. The EU Security-Industrial Complex. Amsterdam: TNI / Statewatch: 6.

[50] Lösing, Sabine / Wagner, Jürgen (2010): Rüstung durch die Hintertür. Das EU-Sicherheitsforschungsprogramm. In: Ausdruck, Nr. 1, February 2010, pp. 29-30: 29.

[51] Slijper, Frank (2005): The emerging EU Military-Industrial Complex. Arms industry lobbying in Brussels. Amsterdam: TNI / Dutch Campaign Against Arms Trade: 24.

[52] Slijper, Frank (2005): The emerging EU Military-Industrial Complex. Arms industry lobbying in Brussels. Amsterdam: TNI / Dutch Campaign Against Arms Trade: 24-26.

[53] Slijper, Frank (2005): The emerging EU Military-Industrial Complex. Arms industry lobbying in Brussels. Amsterdam: TNI / Dutch Campaign Against Arms Trade: 27.

[54] SDA (2010): Who we are. In: www.securitydefenceagenda.org, URL: http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/AboutSDA/Whoweare/tabid/588/Default.aspx (30.09.2010).

[55] Slijper, Frank (2005): The emerging EU Military-Industrial Complex. Arms industry lobbying in Brussels. Amsterdam: TNI / Dutch Campaign Against Arms Trade: 28-29.

[56] Drahokoupil, Jan / Van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan / Horn, Laura (2009): Introduction: Towards a Critical Political Economy of European Governance. In: ead. (eds.): Contradictions and Limits of Neoliberal European Governance. From Lisbon to Lisbon. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 3.

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